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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [SOCI](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [SO](#) [ET](#)
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - A/S FRAZER TELLS PRESIDENT YUSUF TO GET
BEHIND DJIBOUTI PROCESS

Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Affairs Bob Patterson. Reasons:
1.4 (b,d).

11. (C) Summary: In two brief meetings while transiting Nairobi December 22, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Frazer told Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Yusuf that she did not disagree with his dire portrayal of worsening security in Somalia, and agreed that Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) - TFG forces could currently do little to improve it following a possible Ethiopian withdrawal. A/S Frazer urged Yusuf to end his feud with TFG Prime Minister Hussein, noting that continued TFG infighting had complicated the USG's efforts to win support for a UNPKO. Behind the threatened GOE pullout, she noted was Ethiopian frustration with Yusuf's behavior. A/S Frazer told Yusuf that the USG would issue a statement supporting the December 21 IGAD communique, which called for Yusuf to be sanctioned. Yusuf alleged that he had attempted to fire the PM because his term had come to an end. He promised to consider A/S Frazer's comments and consult with his parliamentarians in Baidoa before deciding on his next steps. His aide, al-Azhari stayed behind to inform A/S Frazer that Yusuf wanted her to know he was considering resigning and asked for USG assistance to ensure his smooth transition. Prime Minister Hussein described to A/S Frazer his relations with Yusuf as "difficult." Hussein was not certain that the Parliament would impeach Yusuf, and termed impeachment "not a solution" to the challenged posed by Yusuf to the Djibouti Process. A/S Frazer assured Hussein of continued USG support, noting that there "can't be two (TFG) prime ministers." Hussein urged that the USG provide funding to the planned TFG - ARS joint security force. End summary.

Meeting with Prime Minister

12. (C) In a brief December 22 Nairobi airport meeting, Transitional Federal Government Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein Nur Adde thanked Assistant Secretary Frazer for supportive statements she had made during the December 15 New York International Contact Group (ICG). Hussein told the Assistant Secretary that negotiations on the shape of an enlarged unity parliament were underway, and that he expected they would culminate in the election of a new leadership by the spring. The TFG - ARS unity government urgently needed financial support for its contemplated joint security force, Hussein said. If the unity government could field a respectable force, it could then "mobilize the community to isolate al-Shabaab leaders," and induce Somali media to focus on TFG - ARS successes in implementing the Djibouti agreement. Hussein guessed that the ARS would be able to deploy about two thousand troops. The TFG could field 5000 soldiers, many of whom had been earlier trained by the Ethiopians.

13. (C) Hussein described his relations with TFG President Yusuf as "difficult," but insisted that he had done his best to work with the President. The Prime Minister was not certain if the Parliament would succeed in impeaching Yusuf. In any event, he said, impeachment was not the solution for the problem that Yusuf posed to the Djibouti Process. A/S Frazer assured Hussein of the USG's support. She agreed with the Prime Minister that security was the key, and described efforts the USG was making to pass a UN Security Council resolution that would authorize the deployment of a PKO.

Meeting with President Yusuf

14. (C) TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf insisted to A/S Frazer that he supported the Djibouti Process, and assured her that he would not abandon the reconciliation process. In his pursuit of reconciliation, Yusuf said, he had brought Prime Minister Hussein into the TFG. With Hussein as Prime Minister, security in Somalia had deteriorated, and the TFG was now in its "last stage of collapse." Once the ENDF left Somalia, the TFG remnants and Amisom would not be enough to prevent al-Shabaab from making inroads, even if two additional battalions were added to the Amisom complement.

15. (C) A/S Frazer told Yusuf she did not disagree with his description of eroding security in Somalia, and described USG efforts to re-hat Amisom, which she hoped would improve funding and logistical support, in addition to attracting more troop-contributing countries. The USG would seek as well to finance the projected TFG - ARS joint security force. A/S Frazer told Yusuf that USG and international community

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efforts to improve security in Somalia were being undercut by his continuing feud with the Prime Minister. Division within the TFG made it more difficult to persuade potential donors and colleagues in the UN Security Council that the Djibouti Process could succeed. The President's stand-off with the Prime Minister had also visibly frustrated the Government of Ethiopia.

16. (C) The USG, A/S Frazer said, would continued to recognize Hussein as the TFG prime minister. While the USG recognized and respected Yusuf's services to Somalis, it was now imperative that he find a way to work with the Prime Minister, and to accept his cabinet. A/S Frazer told Yusuf that the USG would publicly associate itself with the December 21 IGAD communique, which had called for Yusuf to be sanctioned.

17. (C) Yusuf insisted that he had attempted to fire Hussein only because his term of office had come to an end. (Note: in fact, in the order signed by Yusuf, Hussein had been fired for failing to complete work on the constitution and for failing to form a government during his one year in office.) He told the Assistant Secretary that he would travel to Baidoa on December 22, where he would consult with parliamentarians and review his options. His aide al-Azhari stayed behind at Yusuf's request to inform A/S Frazer that Yusuf was contemplating resigning as President due to his health, family pressure, and in order to avoid becoming an obstacle to peace. He had not yet firmly decided, but would consult with his supporters in Baidoa, then come back to the USG with his decision. A/S Frazer thanked al-Azhari for the information and said we would wait for Yusuf's decision.

18. (U) Assistant Secretary Frazer cleared this message.
RANNEBERGER